Christopher Erhard (University of Munich)
"Negativer Sachverhalt and négatité. Reinach and Sartre on the Foundations of Negation."
For prima facie obvious reasons, Reinach's and Sartre’s theories of negation are rarely compared. However, I will argue that such a comparison can be fruitful in at least two respects: First, both Reinach and Sartre share a critical attitude towards psychologistic and reductive accounts of negation that not only deny the very existence of negative states of affairs, but also hold that negative judgments can be reduced to affirmations. Second, despite this initial similarity, Reinach and Sartre ultimately end up with highly different metaphysical accounts of negativity. I will point out that this difference can be traced back to different underlying conceptions of phenomenology and phenomenological ontology. In this way, the disagreement about negation can be used to illustrate two ways of understanding phenomenology, namely 'realistic‘ and 'existentialist‘ respectively.
"Negativer Sachverhalt and négatité. Reinach and Sartre on the Foundations of Negation."
For prima facie obvious reasons, Reinach's and Sartre’s theories of negation are rarely compared. However, I will argue that such a comparison can be fruitful in at least two respects: First, both Reinach and Sartre share a critical attitude towards psychologistic and reductive accounts of negation that not only deny the very existence of negative states of affairs, but also hold that negative judgments can be reduced to affirmations. Second, despite this initial similarity, Reinach and Sartre ultimately end up with highly different metaphysical accounts of negativity. I will point out that this difference can be traced back to different underlying conceptions of phenomenology and phenomenological ontology. In this way, the disagreement about negation can be used to illustrate two ways of understanding phenomenology, namely 'realistic‘ and 'existentialist‘ respectively.
Walter Hopp (Boston University)
"Metaphysical, Epistemic, and Transcendental Idealism"
There are considerable reasons to think that Husserl¹s brand of transcendental idealism is incompatible with metaphysical realism about the natural world. One major difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that metaphysical anti-realism stands in tension with two other claims that enjoy significantly stronger phenomenological support. The first is that the natural world presents itself to us, in both thought and perception, as metaphysically real and largely independent, in both its existence and its nature, of our consciousness of it. Second, in accordance with Husserl's "principle of all principles" (Ideas I, §24) this fact provides us with excellent and perhaps conclusive reasons to take it to be metaphysically real. To solve this tension, I will tentatively suggest an interpretation of Husserl¹s transcendental idealism, one that draws from several existing realist interpretations, that is consistent with metaphysical realism.
"Metaphysical, Epistemic, and Transcendental Idealism"
There are considerable reasons to think that Husserl¹s brand of transcendental idealism is incompatible with metaphysical realism about the natural world. One major difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that metaphysical anti-realism stands in tension with two other claims that enjoy significantly stronger phenomenological support. The first is that the natural world presents itself to us, in both thought and perception, as metaphysically real and largely independent, in both its existence and its nature, of our consciousness of it. Second, in accordance with Husserl's "principle of all principles" (Ideas I, §24) this fact provides us with excellent and perhaps conclusive reasons to take it to be metaphysically real. To solve this tension, I will tentatively suggest an interpretation of Husserl¹s transcendental idealism, one that draws from several existing realist interpretations, that is consistent with metaphysical realism.
Kevin Mulligan (University of Geneva, Theology Faculty of Lugano)
"Reinach in the Tractatus?"
Brian McGuinness was perhaps the first person to wonder whether Wittgenstein might have read Reinach ( in particular, "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment"). Since then, Barry Smith, Michael Potter and others have continued to speculate. I consider some of the Reinachian distinctions, categories and claims to be found in the Tractatus and consider the conceptual relations between what Reinach and Wittgenstein do with these.
"Reinach in the Tractatus?"
Brian McGuinness was perhaps the first person to wonder whether Wittgenstein might have read Reinach ( in particular, "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment"). Since then, Barry Smith, Michael Potter and others have continued to speculate. I consider some of the Reinachian distinctions, categories and claims to be found in the Tractatus and consider the conceptual relations between what Reinach and Wittgenstein do with these.
Olivier Massin (Institut Jean Nicod)
"Reinach on Grounding"
While contemporary grounding theorists have paid due tribute to Husserl and Bolzano, Reinach’s approach to grounding relations has remained largely unnoticed. I shall present his approach and argue that it contains invaluable insights for the recent debate over what grounds grounding connections –what grounds the fact that A grounds B? Contemporary theorists, despite disagreeing on the answer to be given, all agree that the question calls for a single answer. By contrast, Reinach endorses a pluralist approach according to which, depending on the cases, the fact that A grounds B is sometimes grounded in the nature of B, but also sometimes in the nature of A, and yet some other times in the nature of another fact C.
"Reinach on Grounding"
While contemporary grounding theorists have paid due tribute to Husserl and Bolzano, Reinach’s approach to grounding relations has remained largely unnoticed. I shall present his approach and argue that it contains invaluable insights for the recent debate over what grounds grounding connections –what grounds the fact that A grounds B? Contemporary theorists, despite disagreeing on the answer to be given, all agree that the question calls for a single answer. By contrast, Reinach endorses a pluralist approach according to which, depending on the cases, the fact that A grounds B is sometimes grounded in the nature of B, but also sometimes in the nature of A, and yet some other times in the nature of another fact C.
Karl Mertens (University of Würzburg )
"Actualising Reinach's Insight: A Straightforward Answer to a Problem in the Phenomenological and Contemporary Theory of Action"
In the last two decades, the contemporary standard theory of action has been criticised for its still too individualistic background. The analysis of both social and individual action thereby generally presupposes an individualistic ontology, which precludes a proper consideration of the particularity of social actions. Similar problems can be identified in the classical phenomenology of action developed by Husserl and Schütz. Alternative views aimed at contrasting such an individualistically based approach have been proposed in both analytical and phenomenological philosophy. The attempt thereby is to develop a kind of holistic theory of action on the basis of a social ontology. Yet, these approaches often produce problems in just the opposite direction. If we take these as the only possible alternatives in order to develop a theory of action, then we seem to be confronted with an impasse. In this paper, I will try to propose a way to avoid this impasse by resorting to Reinach’s considerations on the behavioral and intentional aspects of social acts (as deployed in § 3 of The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law).
"Actualising Reinach's Insight: A Straightforward Answer to a Problem in the Phenomenological and Contemporary Theory of Action"
In the last two decades, the contemporary standard theory of action has been criticised for its still too individualistic background. The analysis of both social and individual action thereby generally presupposes an individualistic ontology, which precludes a proper consideration of the particularity of social actions. Similar problems can be identified in the classical phenomenology of action developed by Husserl and Schütz. Alternative views aimed at contrasting such an individualistically based approach have been proposed in both analytical and phenomenological philosophy. The attempt thereby is to develop a kind of holistic theory of action on the basis of a social ontology. Yet, these approaches often produce problems in just the opposite direction. If we take these as the only possible alternatives in order to develop a theory of action, then we seem to be confronted with an impasse. In this paper, I will try to propose a way to avoid this impasse by resorting to Reinach’s considerations on the behavioral and intentional aspects of social acts (as deployed in § 3 of The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law).
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
"Emotions, Existential Feelings, and the Sense of Reality"
I will criticise Ratcliffe’s theory about existential feelings and the sense of reality by developing a theory of emotions and of their justification that is inspired by the early phenomenologists (Geiger mainly, but also Reinach).
"Emotions, Existential Feelings, and the Sense of Reality"
I will criticise Ratcliffe’s theory about existential feelings and the sense of reality by developing a theory of emotions and of their justification that is inspired by the early phenomenologists (Geiger mainly, but also Reinach).
Denis Seron (University of Liège)
"On Reinach's Realism"
It is commonly assumed that Adolf Reinach (although he never applied the word to himself in his published work) was a full-fledged realist. The aim of this presentation is to clarify in what sense Reinach can be called a “realist”. I identify three distinct realisms in Reinach. First, Reinach advocates, so to speak, a logical realism, claiming that logic should be defined as an ontology of mind-independent states of affairs rather than as, say, a propositional semantics. Second, he is a realist insofar as he seeks to build up a Meinong-style theory of objects based on a non-Husserlian understanding of Husserl’s intuition of essences. Third, Reinach also defends an epistemological realism according to which the burden of proof weights not on the realist, but on the idealist: “We have the right to believe in the outside world”.
"On Reinach's Realism"
It is commonly assumed that Adolf Reinach (although he never applied the word to himself in his published work) was a full-fledged realist. The aim of this presentation is to clarify in what sense Reinach can be called a “realist”. I identify three distinct realisms in Reinach. First, Reinach advocates, so to speak, a logical realism, claiming that logic should be defined as an ontology of mind-independent states of affairs rather than as, say, a propositional semantics. Second, he is a realist insofar as he seeks to build up a Meinong-style theory of objects based on a non-Husserlian understanding of Husserl’s intuition of essences. Third, Reinach also defends an epistemological realism according to which the burden of proof weights not on the realist, but on the idealist: “We have the right to believe in the outside world”.
Michele Summa (University of Würzburg)
"Sham Promises. What Do They Tell Us about the Nature of Social Acts?"
The aim of this paper is to discuss what the sincerity condition for the success of promises implies. To this aim, I will focus on sham promises, or insincere promises, on the basis of Reinach’s and Austin’s approach to, respectively, social acts and performative utterances. While emphasizing that sincerity is required for the success of a promise, both Reinach and Austin are rather quick in their discussion of sham promises. Particularly, they seem to overlook that this observation has a number of implications concerning the experience of self and other, the relation between experiencing and expressing, and eventually the very nature of social acts. What does it mean for a promise to be sincere? And in what sense does the sincerity of promising impinge on our social experience?
In order to answer these questions, I will first discuss Reinach’s and Austin’s sincerity requirements. Subsequently, I will turn to the problem of sincerity, and clarify why sincerity should not be taken to refer to the mere correspondence between inner experience and outer expression, but rather presupposes an act of acknowledging, or ‘owning up’ what one experiences (i.e., the feelings, emotions, intentions, desires, one happens to have). Finally, I will reassess the sincerity or promises on the basis of this general account of sincerity and particularly emphasize three implications: (i) the reciprocity of commitment; (ii) the necessity of explicit expression and first-personal engagement; (iii) the double bind of trust and distrust implied by the social act of promising.
"Sham Promises. What Do They Tell Us about the Nature of Social Acts?"
The aim of this paper is to discuss what the sincerity condition for the success of promises implies. To this aim, I will focus on sham promises, or insincere promises, on the basis of Reinach’s and Austin’s approach to, respectively, social acts and performative utterances. While emphasizing that sincerity is required for the success of a promise, both Reinach and Austin are rather quick in their discussion of sham promises. Particularly, they seem to overlook that this observation has a number of implications concerning the experience of self and other, the relation between experiencing and expressing, and eventually the very nature of social acts. What does it mean for a promise to be sincere? And in what sense does the sincerity of promising impinge on our social experience?
In order to answer these questions, I will first discuss Reinach’s and Austin’s sincerity requirements. Subsequently, I will turn to the problem of sincerity, and clarify why sincerity should not be taken to refer to the mere correspondence between inner experience and outer expression, but rather presupposes an act of acknowledging, or ‘owning up’ what one experiences (i.e., the feelings, emotions, intentions, desires, one happens to have). Finally, I will reassess the sincerity or promises on the basis of this general account of sincerity and particularly emphasize three implications: (i) the reciprocity of commitment; (ii) the necessity of explicit expression and first-personal engagement; (iii) the double bind of trust and distrust implied by the social act of promising.
Basil Vassilicos (Mary Immaculate College/UL)
"Another 'Body' of Social Acts? Reinach and Gestures"
Current research on gestures focuses not just on their status as a semantic counterpart to language but also on their role as a form of action important for both cognition and interaction. This interest is salient in how certain authors have inquired into the relationship between gestures and what they understand as speech acts. After introducing a basic taxonomy of gestures and situating them within Reinach’s theory of social acts, the aim in this paper will be to consider whether and how recent perspectives on gestures raise some questions for his account. We shall then attempt to envisage how Reinach would accommodate those questions, and whether he might pose some questions about gestures in his own right.
"Another 'Body' of Social Acts? Reinach and Gestures"
Current research on gestures focuses not just on their status as a semantic counterpart to language but also on their role as a form of action important for both cognition and interaction. This interest is salient in how certain authors have inquired into the relationship between gestures and what they understand as speech acts. After introducing a basic taxonomy of gestures and situating them within Reinach’s theory of social acts, the aim in this paper will be to consider whether and how recent perspectives on gestures raise some questions for his account. We shall then attempt to envisage how Reinach would accommodate those questions, and whether he might pose some questions about gestures in his own right.